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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

A.

For twelve years the citizens of Eagle, Idaho enjoyed having a small public parking

lot

available to use near a public trailhead connecting to the beautiﬁll Boise river. This parking lot

located in the

Two

governed by the

Rivers subdivision

(“Two Rivers”)

Two Rivers Homeowners Association,

just west of Eagle

Inc.

Road.

Two

Rivers

(Plaintiffs in the

Two

underlying action, Appellants here, and hereafter referred t0 as the “City”) had approved

amended

that approval at the landowner’s request in 2002.

approval that added the small public parking
appeal. This parking lot

is

depicted below.

lot

R at

which forms the subject of

It

was

Wew
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this

2002

this litigation

and

145.

Image capture Aug 2011
Street

is

(Defendants in the underlying action,

Respondents here, and hereafter referred to as the “HOA”). The City of Eagle

Rivers in 1999 and

is

a 2019

Gaogle

This parking lot

is

located on “Lot 35”.

within the circle depicted below. Lot 35

The

location of this parking lot

application to the City

noted below.

R at

which showed

its

owned by the

is

is

For reference, the location of this parking

HOA as a common area lot. R at

consistent With the developer’s

design and speciﬁc location right next to the trailhead, as
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lot is

/

*'-r-.\

\

For over 100 years, Idaho law has recognized that an owner 0f land may, Without deed or
writing, dedicate

required

is

it

t0 public uses.

the assent ofthe

N0

particular

form

is

necessary in the dedication;

all that is

owner ofthe land, and acceptance by the public. That is What happened

in this case. Standing before the Eagle City Council at a public hearing, this landowner/grantor

some of his land

offered

lot adjacent to

for public use. Speciﬁcally,

he offered to provide a small public parking

a public trailhead, t0 support public access to this valuable amenity. The City

accepted the offer,

among

other conditions,

by a public

vote.

Next, the landowner provided the

City a $251,996.00 “Letter of Credit” to ensure certain improvements Within
including the parking

lot,

were

built as

released the Letter of Credit to the landowner.

When

the landowner

still

Once construction was completed,

The parking

owned and

lot

controlled the

was

built

0n

lot t0

the City

HOA property (Lot

HOA.

For over a dozen years the citizens of Eagle and residents of Two Rivers shared
parking

Rivers,

he had agreed. Soon thereafter, the landowner paid for and

built the parking lot, just as the parties intended.

35) at a time

Two

access the adj acent public trailhead; everyone got What they wanted: the

this public

community

could park adjacent to a community trailhead, the HOA/developer got private streets as he had
requested, and the City got a connection for

its

citizens to access the

Boise River. Then in 2016,

years after the developer had released his ownership and control 0f the

course and

now wanted to

stop the public from enjoying

HOA,

HOA changed

the

What had been preserved

for them.

The

HOA was determined t0 keep the public out; ﬁrst with signs, then by installing bollards to prevent
anyone from using

this

parking

lot.

Judgment afﬁrming the public’s
access to

Litigation soon followed, with the City seeking a Declaratory

right t0 park in this lot,

it.
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and

t0 enjoin the

HOA’s

efforts t0

block

The District Court on summary judgment was presented with unique facts that necessitated
a very narrow, case-specific application of Idaho’s long-standing common law dedication
standards. Specifically, the City provided affidavit evidence from (a) the grantor himself,
describing his intent and his offer to dedicate his land for public use, and from (b) the grantee City,
confirming its intent and actions to accept that dedication. The District Court was also presented
with undisputed evidence that the grantor owned and controlled the HOA at all times surrounding
these events. Upon these facts, the City respectfully believes the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the HOA.
On appeal, the City of Eagle requests that the Idaho Supreme Court reverse and remand
the case to District Court with direction to enter judgment in favor of the City, declaring that this
parking lot was dedicated by common law for public use, and to enjoin the HOA from interfering
with the public’s access to it.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On October 10, 2017, the City of Eagle filed a lawsuit in the Fourth Judicial District against

the Two Rivers Homeowners Association. (R. at 7). In that Complaint, the City sought declaratory
and injunctive relief. Specifically, the City wanted the court to declare a certain parking lot within
the Two Rivers Subdivision a public lot, consistent with its historical use and the intent of the
original developer who provided it for public use.
On January 24, 2018, the HOA filed an IRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss this Complaint.
(R. at 47). The City filed its response in opposition on February 26, 2018. (R. at 66). On April
5, 2018, the District Court granted the HOA’s motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety with
one exception: common law dedication. (R. at 86). The Court allowed the City time to file an
Amended Complaint to more clearly articulate its theory of common law dedication. The City filed
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF - 4

that Amended Complaint on April 18, 2018, which provided greater clarity on its common law
dedication claim. (R. at 99). The Record on appeal does not reflect an apparent second motion to
dismiss which was filed by the HOA, as it is referenced in the Court’s Order on August 1, 2018.
(“…Defendant [HOA]’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff [City]’s amended complaint is denied as to
Plaintiff’s claim alleging a common law dedication. The motion is granted as to all other claims.”)
(R. at 114). The HOA filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint on August 13, 2018. (R. at
116).
On March 18, 2019, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its claim of common
law dedication. Four affidavits were provided in support of that Motion: Dan Torfin, the
landowner’s authorized representative (R. at 139-149); Sharon Bergmann, the City clerk (R. at
150-184); William Vaughn, the City zoning administrator (R. at 185-188) and plaintiff’s counsel
Joseph Borton (R. at 189-199). On April 1, 2019, the HOA filed an opposition in support of a
“cross-motion” for summary judgment, although no actual motion was ever filed. Oral argument
on the Motions soon followed.
On May 22, 2019, the District Court entered its Order denying summary judgment for the
City and granting summary judgment for the HOA. (R. at 265-293). On June 5, 2019, a Judgment
of Dismissal was entered. (R. at 294). On July 12, 2019, the City filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. at
296).
C.

Statement of Facts
The District Court properly noted that the relevant facts were largely undisputed. R. at 267.

However, the District Court’s decision makes other factual findings which are not supported by
the Record. Therefore, to supplement and correct the written Findings of the District Court, the
City cites to the following additional facts:
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF - 5

1.

“Two Rivers” is a luxury residential subdivision in Eagle, Idaho. It was developed

over many years by T.R. Company, LLC, its owner Dennis Baker, and its representative Dan
Torfin. Dan Torfin was the Project Manager for the Development. Throughout his work on this
Development, Mr. Torfin was acting as an expressly authorized agent and representative of the
landowner Dennis Baker, a fact that the HOA has conceded in its Answer. R. at 104, 199, and
140.
2.

Two Rivers Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”) is the

successor in interest to T.R. Company LLC. Dennis Baker was the original incorporator, officer
and director of the HOA. Mr. Baker had sole control over the HOA from 2000 through 2004. R.
at 190-199. The HOA manages, among other things, the common areas located within the
Development, including Lot 35, Block 24 where the subject public parking lot was constructed.
R. at 100, 117.
3.

In 1999, the City received an application from Dennis Baker through his company

T.R. Company LLC for a Planned Unit Development called Quarter Circle Ranch Subdivision,
which is now known as “Two Rivers Subdivision,” located in Eagle, Idaho, just west of Eagle
Road. R. at 140.
4.

The location of Two Rivers is generally depicted within the large black circle on

the map marked as Exhibit 1 and attached to the Affidavit of Dan Torfin. (R. at 143).
5.

In 2002, Dennis Baker and his representative Mr. Torfin submitted to the City a

Planned Unit Development (“PUD”) application seeking approval of changes to his Two Rivers
development. The proposed changes included, among other things, the approval of private streets
rather than public streets. To balance the exclusivity of private streets with the public’s need to
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access a public trailhead, the developer included a small public parking lot as part of his project.

(R. at 140, 141, 155, 186).

The Eagle City Council was concerned With

6.

the use 0f private, gated streets within

the development because access t0 the public pathways in the area

this concern,

Messrs. Baker and Torﬁn offered t0

install

would be

limited.

T0

address

a parking lot for use by the public so they

could access the public pathway that was provided adjacent t0 the parking area. The City Council
accepted that offer and the use of private streets and included in their motion for approval the

requirement for Mr. Baker t0 build a parking

lot

open

t0 everyone; not just the residents

of Two

Rivers. R. at 140, 141, 186.

At

7.

that hearing

which occurred 0n November 26, 2002, Dan Torﬁn, the Project

Manager, offered t0 provide a small parking

Doing so was intended t0 help

some of the added demand

alleviate

for use

lot that

would be made

any public parking needs along the road system and capture

0f the trailhead and adjacent public pathway. R.

end of the public hearing the City Council ultimately accepted the
for approval”

available t0 the general public.

offer.

It

Which was made by Councilwoman Sedlacek, who just prior

at 158.

At

the

did so With a “Motion

to

making her motion

for approval stated the following rationale for her decision:

So I’m going t0 support the private streets. My concern too was the narrowness.
That’s been raised to 36 feet wide. Iwas concerned about river access t0 the public.
We have that. Not only that, we have public parking, which we haven’t seen in
some ofthe other subdivisions. A big plus. I appreciate that. So I support the request
for a modiﬁcation. And I’m ready t0 make a motion.
R. at 164.
8.

Councilwoman Sedlacek’s motion

t0

approve the land use application speciﬁcally

included the condition that “the public access remain the

same with the public parking

trailhead.” This Motion was approved 0n a 3-2 vote by the City. R. at I 64
that City

Council meeting conﬁrm that the parking
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lot

was

t0

at the

and I80. Minutes from

be made available for public

use. R.

at 179 (minutes) and 186. The Developer did not file any objection to the condition that a parking
lot be open to the public. “[I]t was our intention to offer that for public use. We were very pleased
that the City accepted our offer for the benefit of the public and approved our application with that
condition. We did not appeal or object to the condition because that was our intent.” R. at 102,
141.
9.

On May 13, 2003, the city of Eagle approved the design review application for the

common area improvements within Two Rivers Subdivision Phases 6 – 12. Part of that approval
included the location and design for this public parking lot upon Lot 35, Block 24 in phase 8 of
the Two Rivers Subdivision. R. at 116, 140, and 147. The Developer designed and built a parking
lot in the location depicted in yellow. R. at 149. It was placed right next to the trailhead for the
pathway and available for use by the general public. That pathway can take the public to the north
all the way to the Boise River. R. at 140.
10.

On August 10, 2004, City Planning staff issued a sign-off memorandum to the City

Clerk indicating that all required improvements within Two Rivers Subdivision No. 8 had been
completed (including the public parking lot) and authorized the release of the $251,996.00 letter
of credit held by the City at that time. R. at 102, 117. For the next ten years, the public used this
small parking lot to access the public trailhead, just as the landowner and the city had intended.
R. at 187.
11.

In 2016, the HOA began impeding the public’s access to this parking lot, first with

signs and then with bollards that prevented anyone from using the parking lot. R. at 103, 104, 187.
The City notified the HOA that their conduct was contrary to the approval and use of this lot. The
HOA refused to allow the public to use this small parking lot to access the trailhead as originally
intended.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the District Court err in granting in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding
that the City failed to allege any cause of action other than Common Law Dedication?

B.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant and
dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint?
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.
The City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, the HOA did not. However, the District

Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the HOA as the non-moving party, which it is
entitled to do on issues of law. See., Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001).
Upon a grant of summary judgment to a non-moving party, this Court on appellate review is to
liberally construe the record in favor of the City, as the party against whom the trial court entered
summary judgment. Id. at 677-678. Conclusions of law by a district court are subject to de novo
review by the Idaho Supreme Court. Doolittle v. Meridian Joint School Dist., 128 Idaho 805
(1996).
B.

The District Court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss which limited the
City of Eagle to advancing a single basis of relief: common law dedication.
In accordance with IRCP 8(a), the City filed a short and plain statement (a 10 page lawsuit)

making alternative demands for relief, the legal basis therefore, and it cited the specific relief
requested. R. at 7-16. Specifically the City alleged three distinct ways in which it may be entitled
to that relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that the City has a legally enforceable interest for
preserving public parking in Lot 35, (2) a lawful exercise of statutory authority under Idaho Code
§50-314, and/or (3) enforcement of Eagle City Code. The City also sought injunctive relief for
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these claims, in hopes of stopping the HOA from physically blocking public access to this small
parking lot. In support of these alternate claims of relief, the City provided the Court as an exhibit
to the Complaint a complete transcript of the public hearing, as well as the official city minutes,
all of which reference the developer’s offer of a parking lot for public use. R. at 17-46. The HOA
soon thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). In
doing so, the HOA asserted that (a) no cognizable claim was pled, and (b) that the City lacked
standing to bring any claim. R. at 50. As to the second claim based on IRCP 12(b)(1), the District
Court correctly rejected the argument. The City had standing to bring its claims. R. at 92. That
finding is not on appeal. The second basis for the motion to dismiss, IRCP 12(b)(6), was found
by the District Court to support a dismissal of “all claims by the City” other than one based upon
a common law dedication. R. at 95. This conclusion of law was in error and should be reversed on
appeal.
A complaint need only state a short and plain statement indicating the Plaintiff is entitled
to the relief requested. IRCP 8(a)(2). Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.
3d 845, 849 (2003). It is a simple notice pleading requirement which has been construed with great
flexibility for decades. So long as the Defendant is put on notice what is claimed against it, courts
have consistently denied 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, despite inartful language used in the
pleading. Furthermore, the court is required to construe all inferences in favor of the City in this
case, and the court could only grant the motion to dismiss if it found that there was no conceivable
set of facts which would have entitled the City to relief. See, Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126
Idaho 960, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). Applying this liberal pleading requirement and the inferences that
can be drawn therefrom, the District Court should have denied the motion to dismiss.
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For example, as to Count Two, the City alleged a statutory right pursuant to its statutory
police powers to ensure the public retains the right to use the parking lot as it had been doing for
years. Rather than a common law dedication basis for relief, this second claim for relief relied
upon Idaho Code §50-314 and other applicable Idaho code. R. at 12-13. There was nothing about
the language in Count Two that made it incapable of succeeding under any possible set of facts.
Of note, discovery had not been completed and this Motion was considered without any affidavits
or exhibits to rely on, as is the normal process for IRCP 12(b)(6) motions.
As to Count Three, the City cited to specific Eagle City Code sections 8-2A-20 and 8-7-2.
These code sections as alleged would require the HOA to maintain the parking lot which was
constructed by the developer upon HOA property for the public to use, consistent with the design
review application approval. R. at 13-14. The Complaint specifically alleges how the City believed
the actions of the HOA were in violation of these code sections, and that the Court could enforce
these code provisions as a basis for ensuring the parking lot remain open to public use.
Count Four simply sought injunctive relief pursuant to IRCP 65. It asked the Court to
prevent the HOA from continuing to exclude the public from using this parking lot, based upon
the factual narrative set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48. R. at 15. The HOA, as alleged, had
physically blocked the parking lot with bollards (which is undisputed) thereby necessitating an
injunction to prevent the HOA from that continued harm to public access. R. at 104. The City
alleged in paragraphs 21, 24, and 27 (R. at 11) escalating evidence of the HOA’s immediate and
continual interference in the public’s ability to access this parking lot. First with the erection of
“resident only” signs (twice) and finally with bollards which ironically blocked anyone from using
the parking lot, residents included. It is clear that the City pled evidence of the injurious effects
of the HOA’s actions, and that evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In fact,
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF - 11

the alleged harm is exactly the type of conduct which can be prevented with injunctive relief, as
there is no remedy at law for the City (and the public) in this instance. “Wrongs which are the
probable result of given means should be prevented, not awaited.” Lanahan v. John Kissel & Son,
C.C., 135 F. 399, 903 (1905). That is exactly what the City intended to do.
Each of the counts look to alternative bases to allow the City to restore the public’s right
to use the parking lot on Lot 35 as the developer and city had expressly intended. Whether the
City would prevail on any or all of these claims was not before the Court. Consistent with the
liberal pleading standards of IRCP 8(a) and the inferences which must be drawn in favor of the
City, the District Court’s decision must be reversed.
C.

The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant
and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Review of the Court’s conclusions, in light of how and why common law dedication has

existed in Idaho for over one hundred years, reveals the fact that summary judgment should have
been awarded in favor of the City, and that the decision and judgment of the Court should be
reversed on appeal. For instance, the District Court stated on page 23 of its decision the following
findings:
“The Court finds T.R. intended to convey an easement over some portion of its land
to the public to use that parcel as public parking. It is clear the City intended to
accept that conveyance when it was made.” R. at 287.
“This court finds that as of November 26, 2002 hearing on T.R.’s rezoning
application, T.R. intended to convey by dedication an easement to the public over
lot 35, block 24 for use as public parking.” R. at 288.
The Court then asserts that the conveyance, and the acceptance were never actually made. That
was an erroneous conclusion. What the District Court failed to recognize is the temporal piece to
the first element of a common law dedication.
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“Dedication” arises
dedication

may be

when

a private landowner sets aside land for public use. That

express 0r implied and

may

common law dedication operates by way 0f an equitable estoppel and creates
statutory dedication operates

interest in the property.

by way of

grant,

law.

A

mere easement.

A

be established statutorily or by

most commonly upon a

a

plat,

common

and transfers a fee

There are two independent ways t0 dedicate land t0 public use. Here the

City does not allege fee ownership in Lot 35, nor does the City allege that the plat noted a grant
for public use.

The two elements of a “common law dedication” have been well

settled for over

100 years,

although never applied to the unique facts present in this case. In order for the City to prevail,

must

establish (1) an offer

by

the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated

by

his

words or

it

acts

evidencing his intention t0 dedicate land t0 a public use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by the

Paddison Scenic Properties

public.

Highway

Dist.

v.

v.

Idaho County, 153 Idaho

public use must be clear. See, Rowley

As

An

3 (2012), citing Worley

Yacht Club 0f Coeur d’Alene, Ltd, 116 Idaho 219, 222 (1989).

acceptance “requires n0 speciﬁc formality,” Paddison,

1.

1,

v.

While public

at 3, the intent to dedicate the

Ada County Highway District, 156 Idaho 275

land for

(2014).

Offer was made.

to the ﬁrst element, the

Record reﬂects public statements made 0n the record

council meeting by the landowner (offeror) and the City (offeree).

N0

at

a city

other case in Idaho has

considered direct evidence from both the offeror and offeree. In exchange for receipt of certain
concessions 0n city development code

(i.e.,

use 0f private

streets), the

City was in turn receiving

for the public’s use a parking lot adj acent to a public trailhead. This clear intent

up with express action by the landowner and the

City.

On March 6, 2003, the Developer submitted

as part of his design review application t0 the City the speciﬁc location
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was then followed

and design for the

previously committed public parking

lot.

R. at 147-148.

Even

if the

landowner here merely

expressed an intent t0 offer in the ﬁxture, in 2003 that offer was speciﬁc, depicted 0n the map, and
complete. There was certainly n0 question 0f exactly What

it

was

built

A

plat

is

not and never has been the exclusive

common law

t0

complete a

does not reference

parking

lot is

not

A plat is only one way that a court can ﬁnd evidence of an offer to dedicate land.

In

fact, the plat

it

has never been the sole source of evidence for a

has ever held as such.

In fact, arguments

this Court. See, e.g., Thiessen

v.

way

dedication 0f land for public use in Idaho.

for the plat in this case, the fact that

dispositive.

available for the public to use once

and being used by the public.
a.

As

was

made

this public

common law dedication, and no court

to the contrary

have been expressly rejected by

v City ofLewz'ston, 26 Idaho 505, 550 (1914); Ashbury Park,

LLC

Greenbriar Estates, 152 Idaho 338 (2012). In Ashbury Park, the Court refused t0 consider the

plat alone, noting that “the substance

0f an offer of dedication

acceptance, and an accepted offer 0f dedication

Site

Lot Owners

v.

b.

is

is

not measured until the time 0f

irrevocable.” Id., at 342, citing

Ponderosa Home

Garﬁeld Bay Resort Ina, 143 Idaho 407, 409, 146 P.3d 673, 675 (2006).

Dan Torﬁn had

authority t0

make the

Here the offer was made by Dan Torﬁn, with actual

offer.

authority. Paragraph

32 of Plaintiff s

First Amended Complaint states:

The Developer, owner 0f What

is

now known as the Two

Rivers Subdivision, acted

and approval process before the City, including
2002 public hearing, through its authorized principals and/or
agent(s) Dennis Baker and Dan Torﬁn.
in the aforementioned application
at the

November

26,

R. at 104.

This fact was admitted in Defendant’s Answer. (R.

at 119).

This fact was then re-afﬁrmed

Within the uncontested afﬁdavit of Dan Torﬁn. “I was acting at that public hearing, and at

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
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all

other

times that

I

was working 0n this development,

0f the landowner, T.R.
Baker. In

fact,

Company LLC, an Idaho limited liability company that is owned by Dennis

Dennis Baker was also present

on behalf of a landowner, 0r

Dedication (section
is

and representative

at the city council

meeting and testiﬁed With me.”

A dedication can be lawfully made and binding if made by someone legally authorized

R. at 140.

t0 act

as an expressly authorized agent

15).

if the

landowner consents. See generally, 23 Am.Jur.2d,

The conclusion ofthe District Court that Mr. Torﬁn did not have

authority

simply contrary to the facts within the Record, facts which are to be construed in favor of the

City.

Harwood, supra.

The HOA knew its land had been

c.

The

District

R. at 286.

it

as public parking.

Not only was

operated the Defendant

0f Lot 35 other than the

servitude

HOA,

the

notice that the land

happened
lot

v.

litigation.

not be enforceable against the

was made by

the

same person who owned and

R. at 100,

1

There

17.

is

it

fact

n0 “subsequent” purchaser

burdened With an easement takes
v.

title

who

-

title

to land

Garﬁeld Bay Resort, 143 Idaho 407, 410 (2006)

The HOA,

was encumbered With a parking

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
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lot

with

to that land subject to the easement.

Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944).

that

HOA.”

The HOA knew that Lot 35 was encumbered With an equitable

here. Again, these facts are unique.

knowing

it

may

and the grantor are the same person. One

Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners
Checketts

promise

HOA itself, which at the time was owned and controlled by the grantor.

HOA
is

that

with notice that [the landowner] had

Dennis Baker, and his land company T.R. Company LLC, a

facts are very unique.

When

HOA took Lot 35

the offer made, but

which the defendant admitted in this

These

common law dedication.

Court was also in error in concluding that “[t]here are issues 0f fact that would

prevent the court from determining if the

promised t0 use

offered for a

as fee

made

That

owner 0f Lot

is

citing

exactly What

35, took

title

available for public use.

to that

One Who

takes

t0 property

title

with actual or constructive notice that

easement takes the land subject
Checketts

v.

t0 the easement.

it

is

burdened with an existing

28 C.J.S. Easements, p 711, §48.

As

Thompson, 65 Idaho 715 (1944).

to the

second element, the record clearly reﬂects acceptance by the public.

among its terms

City voted t0 approve the land use application Which included

can have private roads but you must provide a public parking

landowner

built the public parking lot in

built the public

used

this

lot as available for

parking

exchange for a return 0f his

lot for

this

letter

First, the

a quid pro quo:

lot at the trailhead.

0f the city council public hearing and the ofﬁcial city minutes reﬂect

parking

also,

The Offer was accepted.

2.

Once

See

The

you

transcript

exchange. Next, the

0f

credit.

R. at 102.

over ten years. Signs were installed signifying this

public use. R. at 187.

Use by

the public has been recognized as

sufﬁcient acceptance of a dedication for the purpose 0f establishing a

common law

dedication of

land for public use. Thiessen, at 5 13, 550.

The substance of an

offer

is

measured

at the

time of acceptance. Ashbury Park,

at

343. If

acceptance did not yet occur When the City voted t0 approve the land use application as the District

Court found, the substance of that offer was made certain
review application in 2003, Which included the

The parking

lot.

interruption. R. at

102 (1H7), and 187. That

Use by the public

is

map showing

was then used by

the public parking

lot

is

Paddison

v.

time the City approved the design

the speciﬁc location and design of

the public for over ten years, Without

acceptance.

a sufﬁcient acceptance of a dedication for the purpose 0f a

way

0f way to the public. Thiessen, though nearly one hundred years
has not been overruled or even called into question.

to invest a right
01d,

at the

Idaho County, 153 Idaho

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
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3 (2012).

Here, the public’s use was clear, open, and continual. Public use alone can constitute
acceptance, and once accepted “the servient estate owner has n0 right t0 obstruct the public’s use.”

Id.

The Record

therefore reﬂects that an offer 0f public dedication

the City, as evidenced

by

the grantor’s undisputed afﬁdavit

evidenced by the City’s undisputed afﬁdavit, accepted
parking

lot

was

years. In light of this speciﬁc

The

D.

District

Idaho due

N0
statute

t0

conﬁrming

and

it

in concluding that a

The

that fact.

District Court

common law

dedication

was
is

City, as

result, the

was used by the public

and unique record, the decision 0f the

Court erred

the landowner t0

and dedication. As a

this offer

built as stated within the grantor’s afﬁdavit

was made by

for

many

in error.

not valid in

Idaho Code § 9-503 (Statute of Frauds).

case in Idaho which addresses

common law

dedication has raised the specter of the

of frauds. The conclusion of the District Court casts aside the decision in Thiessen, Which

was reafﬁrmed

in Paddison.

See

also,

Middlekauﬂ v. Lake Cascade, Ina, 110 Idaho 909, 913

(1986) (where this Court reafﬁrmed the rule that oral representations without the use of a plat can

be sufﬁcient evidence to establish a legally enforceable

by which a

“[T]he plat is not the only means

right can be created, oral representations could

dedication ofproperty to a public use

v.

interest.

“may be made

orally,

d0 s0 as

offer of

without a writing or recording.” Pullin

Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 881 (1982).

Idaho Code § 9-503 allows for

common law dedications. By its

language

prevents an interest in property to be conveyed in any manner other than

g

An

well.”)

(ii)

a conveyance or instrument in writing”.

highlights the fact that a writing

is

is

in I.C. § 9-503

-

17

may be

code section

by operation of law,

important in that code, and

only one of two ways a property interest

While the “operation of law” prong

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

The word “0r”

(i)

this

a narrow one,

it

may be
is

the

conveyed.

one

that

Court’s
the City
prevail on
appeal. The
District Court'
allows the
to prevail
on appeal.
The District
law using
the Statute
of
conclusion of
of law
using the
Statute of
City to
allows
s conclusion
the door
t0 close
door on
0n 100
close the
Frauds to
100 years
Dedication jurisprudence
was in
error.
Common Law
jurisprudence was
0f Common
in error.
Law Dedication
years of
Frauds

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
For the
the reasons
reasons stated
stated above,
the City
this Court
reverse the
the trial
trial
that this
requests that
Court reverse
respectfully requests
above, the
City respectfully
For

and remand
the case
case to
the District
remand the
court and
Court with
District Court
with direction
direction to
favor of
to the
t0 enter
enter judgment in
in favor
of the
the
court
City
City.

- "Di
95"“;

.

DATED
DATED

November, 2019.
this~5d;1 ofNovember,
.

th1

day of

2019.
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